why hackers don’t get caught

The paper trail

Most people who are identified online are identified from ordinary business records, kept by companies for billing and security, and handed over one legal request at a time.

An investigator rarely watches anyone in real time. They work backwards from things that were written down: a line in a server log, an address assignment at an ISP, a login record at an email provider, a copy of a passport at a cryptocurrency exchange. None of these records was created to catch anyone. They exist because companies need them to run, bill and secure their services. This page shows who holds which of them, how an investigator moves from one to the next, and where that movement stops.

Who holds what

Each company a person deals with keeps a different slice. The packets page showed the ISP’s piece: which customer line had which public address at which time. Other parties hold other pieces, and the pieces that point at a person are usually not the ones that record activity.

Who you areHow you paidAddresses and timesWhat you didHome or mobile ISPcontract name,service addressbilling accountwhich customer hadwhich address, whenVPN provideran email; oftenno name askedcard or cryptopaymentreal address andtimes, if loggedPlatform (mail, social)phone, email,recovery detailsif on a paid planlogin addressesand timesmessages, posts,filesDomain registrarregistrant contact(not public)paymentaccount loginsHosting provideraccount detailspaymentcontrol-panelloginsthe server's disksand its logsExchange, paymentsID document, selfie,address (KYC)bank account,deposit addresseslogin addressesand timesevery depositand withdrawalpoints at a personactivity recorddepends on the providerusually not held
Who holds which record. Magenta marks records that point at a person (a name, an ID document, a payment card); yellow marks activity records (addresses, times, content). Dashed cells depend on the provider's policy. This is the typical picture, not a legal requirement for any one company.

Platforms are an example of how much a single company holds. Meta’s guidelines for law enforcement say that a subpoena can compel basic subscriber records, which include the name, length of service, credit card information, email addresses and recent login and logout IP addresses.1 Domain registrars collect contact data for each registrant, though since 2018 most of it is no longer published in public WHOIS.9 Under US rules, cryptocurrency exchanges generally count as money transmitters, and their anti-money-laundering programmes must include verifying customer identification, which is why an exchange account is often the record that names someone in a money case.2 A VPN provider may keep almost nothing, or, as the PureVPN case showed, enough connection records to link a customer’s home and work addresses.3

From a log line to a name

The classic chain has four links, and the first one is public. Every block of IP addresses is allocated through one of five regional internet registries, which publish who holds each block.3 A lookup in the registry’s database, through the older WHOIS service or its successor RDAP, tells the investigator which network the address belongs to.4 If that network is a consumer ISP, the next step is a legal request to it: who was using this address, at this second, on this port.

forum.example's logISP's records (legal request)SubscriberOwn public address03:14:07Z198.51.100.23198.51.100.23 held byline 7781, 22:05Z-09:40Zline 7781:Taro YamadaBehind CGNAT, port logged03:14:07Z198.51.100.23:51022NAT: :51022 <- 100.64.12.7100.64.12.7 = line 7781line 7781:Taro YamadaBehind CGNAT, no port03:14:07Z198.51.100.23:many lines shared198.51.100.23 at 03:14:07no single name
The lookup in three cases, for the same log line: forum.example saw 198.51.100.23 at 03:14:07 UTC. With its own public address, the ISP's assignment record gives the line. Behind carrier-grade NAT, the source port is what lets the ISP's NAT log pick one home. Without the port, the chain stops at a crowd.

The same lookup takes several separate requests in practice, each to a different holder and each a chance for the chain to break. Step through it:

Victim's logWho owns itLegal requestSubscriber recordName, addressThe record at this stepHeld by: the victim (a web server)2026-03-14T03:14:07Z 198.51.100.23:51022POST /login 200 (account: anon_4471)Where the chain can break hereno log kept, or already overwrittenclock wrong, or time zone unknownno source port logged (shared NAT)The record at this stepHeld by: a regional internet registry (public)inetnum: 198.51.100.0 - 198.51.100.255netname: EXAMPLENET-BBdescr: ExampleNet broadband customerscountry: JPWhere the chain can break herethe address is a VPN or a cloud server:start again at that companythe address is a Tor exit relay:no record links it to a userThe record at this stepHeld by: the investigator, sent to the ISPTo: ExampleNet, legal compliance1. Preserve records for 198.51.100.232. Identify the subscriber using 198.51.100.23 port 51022 at 2026-03-14 03:14:07 UTCWhere the chain can break herethe ISP is in another country:a cross-border request, often monthsthe logs expire while the paperworkis preparedThe record at this stepHeld by: the ISPline 7781held 2026-03-13T22:05:12Z - 2026-03-14T09:40:31Zaddress 198.51.100.23 (no NAT on this line)Where the chain can break herethe retention period is already overshared NAT with no port records:many customers matchthe contract was in a false nameThe record at this stepHeld by: the ISP's customer fileaccount holder: Taro Yamadaservice address: [street, city]phone: [number]Where the chain can break herethe account holder is not always theperson at the keyboard: family,guests, open Wi-Fi, a hijacked router

It starts with one line written by the system that was attacked: an address, a port and a time. On its own it names nobody.

Follow the chain from one log line to a name. Each step shows the record in hand, who holds it, and the common ways the chain breaks at that point. The last link reaches a customer account, not necessarily the person who typed.

The real cases on this site follow this chain more often than anything exotic. Ardit Ferizi broke into a US retailer’s server from an address in Malaysia, and the same address had logged in to his own Facebook and Twitter accounts; the platforms’ login records closed the chain.25 (case) In the case of Hector Monsegur, “Sabu”, Fox News reported that he once logged in to a chat server from his own address without masking it and that this one entry was enough; Monsegur has disputed that account.8 (case)

Each of those cases is a join: two records held by different companies that share one column, matched once both are in an investigator’s hands. The shared column can be an address and a time, a phone number or an email address. The record that holds a name only needs to share one value with the record that holds the activity.

forum.example: login logaccountanon_4471address + time198.51.100.23 03:14:07ZISP: address assignmentsaddress + time198.51.100.23 22:05-09:40Zaccount holderTaro Yamadamatchanon_4471 = Taro YamadaPlatform: account recordaccountanon_4471verified phone+1 202-555-0147Mobile carrier: contractsphone number+1 202-555-0147contract holderTaro Yamadamatchanon_4471 = Taro Yamadaforum.example: account recordaccountanon_4471recovery emailty4471@mail.exampleExchange: customer file (KYC)emailty4471@mail.exampleverified identityTaro Yamadamatchanon_4471 = Taro Yamada

The forum knows the account but not the person; the ISP knows the person but not the account. The shared column is the address at that moment. Once both tables are in one investigator's hands, the join names anon_4471.

A records join. Two tables held by different companies share one column (yellow). Matching it links the pseudonymous account anon_4471 to the record that holds a name, so the join line is magenta. Pick the shared column: address and time, phone number, or email address.

Where the chain breaks

Each link can fail, and they fail for ordinary reasons. The server may not have kept the log, or kept it without the source port, which behind carrier-grade NAT leaves a crowd of candidates instead of one line.10 The ISP may have deleted the assignment records: how long they keep them depends on national law and on their own policy, and in the EU the Court of Justice has ruled out general, indiscriminate retention of traffic data to fight crime in general, while allowing general retention of the IP addresses assigned to the source of a communication for a period limited to what is strictly necessary.5 And the address may belong to a company rather than an ISP, which is the point of using a relay.

Directserver log198.51.100.23home ISPaddress -> linesubscribername, addressThrough a VPNserver log203.0.113.80VPN providermaybe abroadif it kept logs:real addresshome ISPaddress -> linesubscribername, addressThrough Torserver log192.0.2.201exit operatoronly saw a relayno single relay knowsboth ends of the circuit
The same chain for three routes. A VPN adds a company, often in another country, whose own logs decide whether the chain continues. With Tor, the exit relay's operator saw only another relay, and no single relay knows both the user and the destination.

A VPN does not end the chain by itself; it inserts a link that the investigator has to pass through, under that company’s policy and that country’s law. Tor is different in kind: each relay knows only the relay before it and the relay after it, so there is no single record to request.11 That is why investigations of Tor users, described in the network chapter, went around the network instead: through the device, the account or the server.

Even a complete chain ends at a contract, not a person. The subscriber is whoever pays for the line. Showing who was at the keyboard takes more evidence, and getting that wrong is how innocent people end up arrested, as in the Japanese remote-control virus case.

Clocks and time zones

Every link in the chain is a match on time, often to the second, because addresses and ports are reassigned constantly. A timestamp without a time zone is ambiguous by hours. RFC 6302 asks servers to log timestamps accurate to the second, from a traceable time source, and recommends UTC, for exactly this reason.10 In practice, logs arrive from many systems in many zones, some in local time with no offset written, some in UTC. The investigator converts all of them to UTC before asking anyone anything.

forum.example's log (Tokyo, local time, no offset written)2026-03-14 12:14:07 198.51.100.23:51022ISP: who held 198.51.100.23 on 2026-03-14 (UTC)Read as UTC: 12:14:07 UTCline 7781line 441000:0003:0006:0009:0012:0015:0018:00lands on line 4410: the wrong householdConverted from UTC+9: 03:14:07 UTCline 7781line 441000:0003:0006:0009:0012:0015:0018:00lands on line 7781: the right one
One timestamp, two readings. forum.example's server in Tokyo wrote 12:14:07 local time without an offset. Read as UTC (top), the lookup lands nine hours late, on line 4410, which held the address by then. Converted from UTC+9 (bottom), it is 03:14:07 UTC and lands on line 7781. Assignment times are illustrative.

A one-hour mistake around a daylight-saving change, or a server clock that drifted a few minutes, can have the same effect. This is one of the dull places where a correct chain of reasoning produces the wrong name.

None of these companies hands over customer records because someone asks nicely. In the United States, the Stored Communications Act sets the levels. Basic subscriber information, including name, address, session times and the network address assigned, can be obtained with a subpoena. More detailed records need a court order based on “specific and articulable facts”, and content generally needs a warrant.6 The same law lets the government ask a provider to preserve records for 90 days, renewable for another 90, while the formal request is prepared.6

Across a border it becomes slow. A foreign investigator has no power to compel a US company. For records the company will not hand over on its own, and above all for the content of messages, the route is a request under a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), sent government to government. In the US it lands at the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs, which gathers evidence on behalf of foreign investigators, and US law still requires the usual legal process before a provider may hand over content.78 The Justice Department’s inspector general describes the rest: every treaty country designates a central authority, usually its justice ministry; OIA executes incoming requests with US Attorneys’ Offices and the FBI, especially for electronic evidence from communications providers; and a federal statute lets a US court issue an order or warrant on the strength of the foreign request alone.9 Put together, a request passes through two governments and a court before the provider sees it. A 2013 review commissioned by the White House found that requests to the US took on average about ten months to fulfil.8 Logs with a retention period of weeks do not survive that.

Same countryInvestigatorSubpoena orcourt orderProviderrecords come back directlyAcross aborder (MLAT)InvestigatorOwn centralauthorityTheir centralauthorityTheir courtor prosecutorProviderrecords come back the same way: about 10 months on average to the US (2013)24/7 network(Budapest)Investigator24/7 contactpointProvider:preserve nowdata is frozen, not yet handed over
Two routes to the same record. Domestically, one legal order goes from the investigator to the provider. Across a border, the request passes through two central authorities and a foreign court before reaching the provider, and the answer comes back the same way. The dashed route is the Budapest Convention's 24/7 network, which can get data preserved quickly while the slow request is under way.

The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, opened for signature in Budapest on 23 November 2001, exists largely to speed this up. Its parties commit to preserving data quickly on request from another party and to keep a contact point available around the clock.10 A second additional protocol, opened for signature in 2022, would go further and let authorities ask service providers in other parties directly for subscriber information and domain registration data. It enters into force only once five parties have ratified it.11 The EU’s regulation on electronic evidence, which has applied since 18 August 2026, lets a judicial authority in one member state order a provider in another to produce data within ten days, or eight hours in an emergency.12

These instruments only help between countries that join them and cooperate in practice. When the chain leads to a state that does neither, it stops at a name on a charge sheet, which is the subject of Named, never arrested.

Common misconceptions

  • “An IP address identifies a person.” It identifies a line or an account at a moment. Behind carrier-grade NAT it identifies only a group of lines unless the port is logged too.9
  • “The police can look up who had an address.” Only the ISP can, from its own records, and only in answer to legal process.6
  • “Logs are kept forever.” Retention is limited by law and by cost. Many chains break simply because the records were gone by the time anyone asked.5
  • “Using a foreign provider makes records unreachable.” It makes them slower to reach. Treaties, preservation requests and direct-cooperation agreements exist for exactly this case.10

Sources

  1. MetaInformation for law enforcement authoritiesprimary
  2. FinCENApplication of FinCEN's Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies (FIN-2019-G001)primary
  3. IANANumber Resourcesprimary
  4. IETFRFC 9083: JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)primary
  5. Court of Justice of the European UnionPress release No 123/20: Judgments in Case C-623/17 Privacy International and in Joined Cases C-511/18 La Quadrature du Net and Othersprimary
  6. Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School18 U.S. Code § 2703: Required disclosure of customer communications or recordsprimary
  7. US Department of Justice, Criminal DivisionOffice of International Affairs (OIA)primary
  8. President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies (White House)Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations of the President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologiesprimary
  9. US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector GeneralAudit of the Criminal Division's Process for Incoming Mutual Legal Assistance Requests (Report 21-097)primary
  10. Council of Europe (copy hosted by the Organization of American States)Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185), Budapest, 23.XI.2001 (treaty text)primary
  11. Council of EuropeSecond Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime on enhanced co-operation and disclosure of electronic evidence (CETS No. 224)primary
  12. EUR-LexRegulation (EU) 2023/1543 on European Production Orders and European Preservation Orders for electronic evidenceprimary