why hackers don’t get caught

Why don’t hackers get caught? Some are never found. Many are found, and out of reach.

Hiding who you are online is done in layers: a network route, a clean machine, a made-up name, laundered money. Each layer hides one thing from one observer. The people who are caught usually lost one of those layers, often not the one they worried about, or stepped within reach. This site takes the layers apart and looks at both kinds of ending.

Three endings

  1. Never identified

    Name
    unknown
    Where
    unknown
    In custody
    no

    Every layer held, or nobody could afford to look that hard. These endings leave no case file.

  2. Identified, out of reach

    Name
    known
    Where
    known
    In custody
    no

    Named in an indictment, sanctioned, a bounty on their head, and living where no court will hand them over.

    Why they stay out of reach

  3. Caught

    Name
    known
    Where
    known
    In custody
    yes

    One layer gave way, or they travelled within reach. The case files show which.

    Case files

Named, never arrested

Ten US indictments of people hacking for or on behalf of a state, 2014 to 2025. Every square is a named defendant.

Named in ten US indictments, 2014 to 2025: one square per person0state officers arrestedof 58 people (60 names) in 10 US indictments, 2014 to 2025Others arrested: 32 Malaysian businessmen, 1 Canadian launderernamed, no arrest announcedarrestednamed again2014PLA Unit 61398China · trade secrets from US nuclear, steel and solar firmsWang DongSun KailiangWen XinyuHuang ZhenyuGu Chunhui52016ITSec Team, Mersad (IRGC)Iran · DDoS on 46 firms, mostly banks; a New York damAhmad FathiHamid FirooziAmin ShokohiSadegh AhmadzadeganOmid GhaffariniaSina KeissarNader Saedi72018GRU Units 26165, 74455Russia · hacked the DNC and Clinton campaign, leaked itViktor NetykshoBoris AntonovDmitriy BadinIvan YermakovAleksey LukashevSergey MorgachevNikolay KozachekPavel YershovArtem MalyshevAleksandr OsadchukAleksey PotemkinAnatoliy Kovalev122018Chosun Expo (Lazarus)North Korea · Sony 2014, Bangladesh Bank $81M, WannaCryPark Jin Hyok12020APT41China, Malaysia · 100+ victims: software, games, telecomsZhang HaoranTan DailinJiang LizhiQian ChuanFu QiangWong Ong Hua (arrested in Malaysia)Ling Yang Ching (arrested in Malaysia)72 Malaysians arrested2020GRU Unit 74455 (Sandworm)Russia · Ukraine blackouts, NotPetya, OlympicsYuriy AndrienkoSergey DetistovPavel FrolovAnatoliy Kovalev (also named in 2018)Artem OchichenkoPetr Pliskin6Kovalev, again2021RGB (Lazarus)North Korea · theft and extortion of over $1.3BJon Chang HyokKim IlPark Jin Hyok (also named in 2018)Ghaleb Alaumary, Canadian launderer, charged separately3Park, again; + launderer2021APT40, Hainan State SecurityChina · trade secrets, US and 11 other countriesDing XiaoyangCheng QingminZhu YunminWu Shurong42024IRGC hack-and-leakIran · Trump campaign email, leaked to Biden campMasoud JaliliSeyyed Ali AghamiriYaser Balaghi32025i-Soon, MPS, APT27China · dissidents, US Treasury, foreign ministriesWu HaiboChen ChengWang ZheLiang GuodongMa LiWang YanXu LiangZhou WeiweiWang LiyuSheng JingYin KechengZhou Shuai12"No arrest announced": no later US Justice Department announcement of an arrest,extradition or guilty plea. The 2021 launderer was charged separately.
  • 2014, PLA Unit 61398 (China), trade secrets from US nuclear, steel and solar firms: Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, Gu Chunhui
  • 2016, ITSec Team, Mersad (IRGC) (Iran), DDoS on 46 firms, mostly banks; a New York dam: Ahmad Fathi, Hamid Firoozi, Amin Shokohi, Sadegh Ahmadzadegan, Omid Ghaffarinia, Sina Keissar, Nader Saedi
  • 2018, GRU Units 26165, 74455 (Russia), hacked the DNC and Clinton campaign, leaked it: Viktor Netyksho, Boris Antonov, Dmitriy Badin, Ivan Yermakov, Aleksey Lukashev, Sergey Morgachev, Nikolay Kozachek, Pavel Yershov, Artem Malyshev, Aleksandr Osadchuk, Aleksey Potemkin, Anatoliy Kovalev
  • 2018, Chosun Expo (Lazarus) (North Korea), Sony 2014, Bangladesh Bank $81M, WannaCry: Park Jin Hyok
  • 2020, APT41 (China, Malaysia), 100+ victims: software, games, telecoms: Zhang Haoran, Tan Dailin, Jiang Lizhi, Qian Chuan, Fu Qiang, Wong Ong Hua (arrested in Malaysia), Ling Yang Ching (arrested in Malaysia)
  • 2020, GRU Unit 74455 (Sandworm) (Russia), Ukraine blackouts, NotPetya, Olympics: Yuriy Andrienko, Sergey Detistov, Pavel Frolov, Anatoliy Kovalev (also named in 2018), Artem Ochichenko, Petr Pliskin
  • 2021, RGB (Lazarus) (North Korea), theft and extortion of over $1.3B: Jon Chang Hyok, Kim Il, Park Jin Hyok (also named in 2018), Ghaleb Alaumary, Canadian launderer, charged separately
  • 2021, APT40, Hainan State Security (China), trade secrets, US and 11 other countries: Ding Xiaoyang, Cheng Qingmin, Zhu Yunmin, Wu Shurong
  • 2024, IRGC hack-and-leak (Iran), Trump campaign email, leaked to Biden camp: Masoud Jalili, Seyyed Ali Aghamiri, Yaser Balaghi
  • 2025, i-Soon, MPS, APT27 (China), dissidents, US Treasury, foreign ministries: Wu Haibo, Chen Cheng, Wang Zhe, Liang Guodong, Ma Li, Wang Yan, Xu Liang, Zhou Weiwei, Wang Liyu, Sheng Jing, Yin Kecheng, Zhou Shuai

Why they stay out of reach

When they are caught

Documented arrests and identifications, grouped by the layer investigators got through first. It is rarely the one people worry about.

All cases

How they hide: who can see what

Three relays. No single relay sees both who you are and where you go.

  1. Person
  2. 4 layers of encryption.
  3. 4 layers of encryption.
  4. VPN provider (not on this route)
  5. 4 layers of encryption.
  6. 3 layers of encryption.
  7. 2 layers of encryption.
  8. 1 layer of encryption.

Try:

What they can read
Tor guardTor exit
Sender address198.51.100.23 (points at the person)192.0.2.77 (relay)
Destination192.0.2.77 (relay)forum.example
Content hidden: 3 layers of encryption hidden: encrypted
Timing and volumeentry sideexit side
Account hidden hidden

Linkable by timing

No one sees both, but together they hold the sender at one end and the destination at the other. Matching packet timing and volume joins the two.

 hiddenabc readableabc points at the person one line per layer of encryption on that linkAssumptions: the website uses HTTPS; every operator logs what passes through but breaks no encryption. Addresses are from documentation ranges.

The layers they hide behind

Ordered from the person outward. Each layer hides something different, and each one has a characteristic way of failing.

First, the basics

The layer chapters lean on a few ideas: how data crosses the internet, what encryption hides, who keeps which records, and how a public ledger works. Each is drawn step by step.

  1. What travels on the wire
  2. What encryption hides, and what it doesn't
  3. The paper trail
  4. Blockchains in five minutes