why hackers don’t get caught

What travels on the wire

A message crosses the internet as numbered packets, each wearing an envelope that every box on the way can read; this page shows what is written on that envelope and who writes it down.

When you open a web page, nothing travels to you as one piece. Your request and the reply are cut into small parcels, and each parcel carries a label saying where it came from and where it is going. Most of what the rest of this site calls “hiding” is about that label: who can read it, and who keeps a copy. This page explains the label and the machines that read it, from the laptop on your desk to the server on the other side.

The addresses in the figures come from blocks reserved for documentation, so none of them belongs to a real network.1 They follow one scene throughout: a person whose home connection has the public address 198.51.100.23 logs in to a forum at forum.example (server 203.0.113.10) at 03:14:07 UTC on 14 March 2026, as the account anon_4471.

A message becomes packets

Networks carry data in packets of limited size. On Ethernet, the most common kind of local network, an IP packet can be at most 1,500 bytes long.2 A web page, a photo or even a long form submission is larger than that, so the sending computer cuts it into slices, wraps each slice in a header and sends the slices one after another. The receiver puts them back in order.

The message: 4,000 bytesbytes 1-1,460bytes 1,461-2,920bytes 2,921-4,000packet 1from198.51.100.23to203.0.113.10bytes 1-1,460packet 2from198.51.100.23to203.0.113.10bytes 1,461-2,920packet 3from198.51.100.23to203.0.113.10bytes 2,921-4,000The receiver puts the slices back in orderheader: read by every router on the waypayload: one slice of the message
A 4,000-byte message leaves as three packets. Every packet carries a full copy of the header (yellow, because every router on the way can read it) and one slice of the message. The slices can arrive out of order; numbering in the TCP header lets the receiver reassemble them.

Two consequences follow. First, every packet carries the addresses, not just the first one, so anyone who sees any part of the conversation sees who is talking to whom. Second, the packets are independent: each one is forwarded on its own, and a network does not need to understand the message to deliver it.

The envelope: the IP header

The header the Internet Protocol puts in front of each slice is defined in RFC 791, published in 1981 and still the format of every IPv4 packet.3 It is 20 bytes long in the usual case and holds a dozen fields. Two matter most here: the destination address, which every router reads to decide where to send the packet next, and the source address, which tells the other side where to send replies.

One packet, as a router sees it08162431bitVer 4IHLDSCP/ECNTotal length 1,500IdentificationFlgFragment offsetTTL 64Protocol 6Header checksumSource address 198.51.100.23Destination address 203.0.113.10Source port 51022Destination port 443Sequence number, flags, window ...Data: 1,460 bytes, encrypted by TLSIP header20 bytesthe envelopeTCP headerports and orderDatathe letterwhere replies go
An IPv4 header (RFC 791) drawn 32 bits per row, followed by the start of the TCP header and the data. Everything in yellow travels in the clear even when the content is encrypted. The source address is outlined in magenta because it is the field that leads back to the sender's connection.

The comparison with a letter is close. The header is the outside of the envelope: postal workers have to read it, and they can copy it down. The data is the letter inside. With HTTPS the letter is sealed by TLS, but the envelope cannot be sealed, because nobody could deliver it. The time-to-live field (TTL) is a hop counter: each router lowers it by one and discards the packet when it reaches zero, so a packet caught in a routing loop does not circle forever.3

IPv6, the newer version, uses a different header with longer addresses, but the same two fields sit in it, in the clear, for the same reason.4

The same packet can also be read as a record with five fields, the ones the figure on the home page uses: who sent it, where it goes, what it says, when and how much, and which account it belongs to. Encryption changes only some of them.

The same packet as a record, seen by the ISPPlain HTTPSender address198.51.100.23 (your line)Destination203.0.113.10 forum.exampleContentPOST /login, your messageTiming and volume03:14:07 UTC, 1,500 bytesAccountanon_4471everything is readableHTTPS (TLS)Sender address198.51.100.23 (your line)Destination203.0.113.10 forum.exampleContentTiming and volume03:14:07 UTC, 1,500 bytesAccountTLS hides content and account
The login to forum.example as a record, seen by the person's ISP. Left, plain HTTP: every field is readable. Right, HTTPS: TLS hides the content and the account name, but the addresses, the site's name (sent in the TLS hello) and the timing and size stay readable. The sender address is magenta because the ISP knows whose line it is.

Hop by hop

No single machine knows the whole route. Each router looks at the destination, picks the neighbour that is closer to it, and hands the packet on. Between your laptop and a server there are several such hands: your home router, several routers inside your ISP, often an internet exchange where networks meet, and the routers of the server’s own network.

LaptopHome routerISPExchange (IXP)ServerThe packet's header after this pointSource192.168.1.10:52144Destination203.0.113.10:443TTL64Contentyour requestWhat this box readsEverything. It built the packet.What it may write downbrowser history, DNS cache,app and system logsThe packet's header after this pointSource198.51.100.23:51022rewrittenDestination203.0.113.10:443TTL63ContentWhat this box readsAddresses and ports. It swaps your privatesource for its one public address (NAT).What it may write downNAT table, while the connection lasts:192.168.1.10:52144 <-> 198.51.100.23:51022The packet's header after this pointSource198.51.100.23:51022Destination203.0.113.10:443TTL61ContentWhat this box readsThe destination, to choose the next hop.It knows which customer owns this line.What it may write down2026-03-13T22:05:12Z 198.51.100.23 assigned to line 7781flow record, if collected: 198.51.100.23:51022 -> 203.0.113.10:443The packet's header after this pointSource198.51.100.23:51022Destination203.0.113.10:443TTL61ContentWhat this box readsNot the IP header. It is a shared switchwhere networks hand traffic to each other.What it may write downsampled traffic statistics (sFlow):headers of a small fraction of packetsThe packet's header after this pointSource198.51.100.23:51022Destination203.0.113.10:443TTL58Contentyour requestWhat this box readsEverything. It ends the encryptedconnection and reads the request.What it may write down198.51.100.23:51022 [14/Mar/2026:03:14:07 +0000] "POST /login" 200

Your laptop builds the packet. Its source address 192.168.1.10 is private: it means something only inside your home, and thousands of other homes use the same number.

Step a packet from a laptop to a server. At each box: the header as it leaves, what the box reads, and what it may write down. The home router rewrites the source; the ISP's assignment record is the entry that ties the public address to a paying customer (magenta). Times are in UTC.

Forwarding a packet does not require keeping a record of it, and most routers keep none per packet. Records come from somewhere else. The ISP keeps track of which customer line was given which public address, because it needs that to run the service and bill for it. Networks can also export flow records, one line per conversation with the addresses, ports, start and end time and byte counts, using formats such as IPFIX.5 Exchanges and large networks can also sample a small fraction of packet headers with sFlow to see where their traffic goes.6 And the server at the end writes an access log line for each request, with the address and the time. That last line is where most investigations start, as the records page shows.

Private addresses and NAT

There are not enough IPv4 addresses for every device. Three blocks, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16, are set aside for private use and are never routed on the public internet; any home or office may use them internally.7 The laptop’s 192.168.1.10 is such an address. Thousands of other homes use the same number.

To reach the internet, the home router performs network address translation (NAT). It replaces the private source address with its own public address and a port number it chooses, and keeps a table so that replies get back to the right device. Every device in the house shares one public address.

Many ISPs now do the same thing one level up. With carrier-grade NAT (CGN), customer routers get addresses from a block reserved for this purpose, 100.64.0.0/10, and the ISP translates them to a smaller pool of public addresses shared by many customers at once.8 In October 2017 Europol said that CGN was used for 90% of mobile internet access and 50% of fixed-line access, that one address could be shared by several thousand people, and that mobile providers using it often could not tell which subscriber had used an address.9

Server logged address + time03:14:07Z 198.51.100.23Home A100.64.12.5Home B100.64.12.7Home C100.64.12.9ISP's shared NATpublic address198.51.100.23no port: the NAT logcannot pick one home3 candidates (often far more)Server logged address + port + time03:14:07Z 198.51.100.23:51022Home A100.64.12.5Home B100.64.12.7Home C100.64.12.9ISP's shared NATpublic address198.51.100.23ISP's NAT log at 03:14:07Z:51022 <- 100.64.12.7:401231 home: B, router 100.64.12.7
Three homes behind the shared public address 198.51.100.23, in two panels. Left: the server logged only the address and the time, so every home behind the address is a candidate. Right: it also logged source port 51022, and the ISP's NAT log maps that port to one home router, 100.64.12.7.

The fix is in the logs, not the network. The IETF’s logging recommendation for servers says that, because addresses are shared, a server should log the source port and an accurate timestamp along with the address.10 The ISP, for its part, has to log which port range each customer was given when. If either side is missing, the trail stops at a crowd.

Names: the DNS lookup

People type names, packets need numbers. The Domain Name System (DNS) translates one to the other.11 Your device asks a resolver, usually run by your ISP or a public service, and the resolver asks the hierarchy on your behalf: the root servers, then the servers for the top-level domain, then the server for the domain itself. With query minimisation, the resolver tells each server only as much of the name as that server needs to answer.12

Your laptop192.168.1.101 forum.example ?5 203.0.113.10your ISP carries thisResolver192.0.2.532 example ?ask the .example serversRoot servers3 forum.example ?ask forum.example's server.example servers4 forum.example ?203.0.113.10forum.example's serverWho learns whatISP, on the wireyour line + the nameif DNS is unencryptedResolver198.51.100.23+ forum.exampleRootexampleresolver's address.exampleforum.exampleresolver's addressforum.example's serverforum.exampleresolver's address

1. Your laptop asks the resolver for forum.example. The question comes from your home address, 198.51.100.23, so the resolver learns who asked for which name. Unless the query is encrypted, your ISP can read it on the way.

Looking up forum.example in five numbered steps; select a step to read what happens. The resolver does the walking; each server in the hierarchy sees the resolver's address, not yours, and (with query minimisation) only part of the name. The resolver itself sees your address and the full name, and so does your ISP if the query is sent unencrypted.

The privacy point is who learns the full name together with your address: the resolver, always, and anyone on the path if the query travels in plain text, which classic DNS does. DNS over TLS and DNS over HTTPS encrypt the query between you and the resolver.136 That hides the name from the ISP’s wire, but not from the resolver, which now becomes the party that holds the record.

Ports and connections

An address gets a packet to a machine; a port number gets it to the right program on that machine. Servers listen on well-known ports, such as 443 for HTTPS, and the client picks a temporary port for its side of each connection; the IANA registry records which numbers are assigned to which services.14 Four numbers together, source address, source port, destination address and destination port, name one conversation. That is why the source port matters so much behind NAT: it is the only number that tells two customers on the same public address apart.

A connection is named by four numbers198.51.100.23your address51022temporary port203.0.113.10server address443443 = HTTPS->you :51022server :443timeSYN: may I connect?SYN-ACK: yes, go aheadACK: connecteddata, encrypted by TLSFIN: done
A connection is named by four numbers. TCP opens it with a three-way handshake (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK), then carries the encrypted data, then closes it. The handshake and the headers are readable to every box on the path; only the data inside is encrypted.

TCP, the protocol most web traffic uses, sets up each connection with three packets before any data flows: the client sends SYN, the server answers SYN-ACK, the client confirms with ACK.15 It numbers the bytes it sends so the receiver can put slices back in order and ask for missing ones again. None of this is encrypted. TLS protects the data inside the connection, not the fact of the connection.

What an ISP sees without breaking encryption

Put the pieces together and look from the ISP’s position. It does not need to break anything. It sees which of its customers sent each packet, the server’s address, and usually the name: once in the DNS query, unless DNS is encrypted, and once more in the opening message of TLS, where the client states which site it wants in a field called Server Name Indication (SNI), sent in clear text.16 A newer extension, Encrypted Client Hello, hides that name from the path when both browser and site support it.7 The ISP also sees when each connection starts and ends and how many bytes go each way.

One visit to forum.example, as your ISP sees itsentreceivedDNS: forum.exampleTLS hello: forum.example (SNI)page loads: about 1 MB, under a secondyou read the page: nothing sentyou submit a form: a few KB upReadable without breaking encryptionyour line, so the customerserver address 203.0.113.10the name (DNS, SNI)when, how long, how muchHidden by TLSwhich page (/login, /post/...)what you typedwhat the page said
One HTTPS visit as the ISP sees it: packets over time, sent above the line, received below, height proportional to size. Yellow is readable (the DNS query, the TLS hello with the name); black is encrypted content whose size and timing remain visible. The customer line is outlined in magenta because the ISP knows whose line it is.

The IETF’s own analysis of pervasive surveillance puts it plainly: encrypted traffic still exposes everything in its network and transport headers, addresses and ports included, and an observer who cannot decrypt anything can still fingerprint encrypted sessions and draw inferences from them.17 Sizes and timing are what website-fingerprinting research uses to guess which page is loading, even through Tor.24

How this maps to the chapters

The network chapter is about one field in the header: the source address. VPNs, proxies and Tor all work by making that field belong to someone else, which means handing your packets to a relay that sees what your ISP used to see. The question becomes who that relay is and what it writes down.

The device chapter is about what happens inside the encrypted letter and on the machine that writes it. A perfect envelope does not help if the program on the device reveals the real address another way, or if the device itself is identifiable.

The records page picks up the trail from the other end: the log line at the server, and the chain of records that turns an address and a time into a name.

Sources

  1. IETFRFC 5737: IPv4 Address Blocks Reserved for Documentationprimary
  2. IETFRFC 894: A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over Ethernet Networksprimary
  3. IETFRFC 791: Internet Protocolprimary
  4. IETFRFC 8200: Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specificationprimary
  5. IETFRFC 7011: Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Informationprimary
  6. IETFRFC 3176: InMon Corporation's sFlow: A Method for Monitoring Traffic in Switched and Routed Networksprimary
  7. IETFRFC 1918: Address Allocation for Private Internetsprimary
  8. IETFRFC 6598: IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address Spaceprimary
  9. EuropolAre you sharing the same IP address as a criminal? Law enforcement call for the end of Carrier Grade NAT (CGN) to increase accountability onlineprimary
  10. IETFRFC 6302: Logging Recommendations for Internet-Facing Serversprimary
  11. IETFRFC 1034: Domain Names - Concepts and Facilitiesprimary
  12. IETFRFC 9156: DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve Privacyprimary
  13. IETFRFC 7858: Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)primary
  14. IETFRFC 6335: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Procedures for the Management of the Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registryprimary
  15. IETFRFC 9293: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)primary
  16. IETFRFC 6066: Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitionsprimary
  17. IETFRFC 7624: Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat Model and Problem Statementprimary