why hackers don’t get caught

Named, never arrested

Many of the people behind the worst attacks are not anonymous at all. They have been named and charged, and they live in states that will not hand them over.

After every large attack someone asks why nobody has been arrested. The question assumes the problem is finding the culprit. Often it is not: investigators know the name, publish it and file the charges, and the person goes on living at home, because home is a state that will not extradite them and has no reason to stop them.

Three outcomes, not one

“They didn’t get caught” covers three different situations, and they have different causes.

The first is that nobody knows who did it. Every layer the person relied on held, or at least nobody has yet found the one that did not. The chapters on this site are about that problem: how each layer hides something, and how it gives way.

The second is that investigators do know. The person is identified, often by name, date of birth and employer, and charged in a court that will never see them. This group is larger than most people assume, and it is what this page is about.

The third is that the person is caught. In the documented cases on this site that almost always happens because one layer gave way while the person was already within reach of a court, or because a person who was out of reach stepped inside it. The case files record which layer failed each time. Incognito Market’s operator, for example, was arrested at New York’s JFK airport in May 2024 while in transit 48 49; see the Incognito entry and the money chapter.

Ten indictments, fifty-eight people

Figure 1 collects ten US indictments, from 2014 to 2025, of people charged with hacking for, or on behalf of, a foreign government. What each case was about matters, because none of them is a minor intrusion.

In May 2014 five officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unit 61398 were charged with breaking into Westinghouse, SolarWorld, US Steel, Allegheny Technologies, Alcoa and the United Steelworkers union between 2006 and 2014, taking plant designs, internal communications and other material useful to Chinese state-owned competitors. The department called it the first time it had charged a state actor for this kind of hacking 1.

In March 2016 seven Iranians working for two companies on behalf of the Iranian government, including the Revolutionary Guard, were charged over denial-of-service attacks on 46 companies, mostly US banks, on more than 176 days between 2011 and 2013. Customers could not reach their accounts, and the banks spent tens of millions of dollars on remediation. One of the seven was also charged with getting into the control system of the Bowman Avenue Dam in Rye, New York, whose sluice gate happened to be disconnected for maintenance 2.

In July 2018 twelve officers of Russia’s military intelligence service, the GRU, were charged with hacking the Democratic National Committee, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the Clinton campaign and releasing the stolen material through the personas “DCLeaks” and “Guccifer 2.0” 10. That September a North Korean programmer, Park Jin Hyok, was charged as part of the team behind the 2014 destructive attack on Sony Pictures, the theft of $81 million from Bangladesh Bank in 2016 and the WannaCry ransomware of 2017 3.

In September 2020 five Chinese nationals were charged over intrusions at more than 100 companies and organisations worldwide, among them software makers, telecoms providers, video game companies, universities and foreign governments, together with ransomware and cryptocurrency mining on victims’ machines. Two Malaysian businessmen were charged with profiting from the attacks on game companies 4. A month later six GRU officers were charged over KillDisk and Industroyer, which caused blackouts in Ukraine, NotPetya, which caused nearly $1 billion in losses to three victims named in the indictment alone, and Olympic Destroyer, which disrupted the 2018 Winter Olympics 4.

In February 2021 three officers of North Korea’s Reconnaissance General Bureau, Park among them, were charged with a scheme to steal and extort more than $1.3 billion in cash and cryptocurrency from banks and companies 5. In July 2021 three officers of the Hainan State Security Department and a hacker at their front company were charged with stealing trade secrets and research, in aviation, maritime technology, biomedicine and other fields, from victims in the United States and eleven other countries 6.

In September 2024 three Iranians were charged with breaking into the email of advisers to the Trump campaign and sending stolen debate-preparation material to people around the Biden campaign and to journalists 7 9. In March 2025 twelve people, among them two officers of China’s Ministry of Public Security and eight employees of the contractor i-Soon, were charged with hacking US-based dissidents and religious organisations, news outlets, US federal and state agencies including the Treasury, and the foreign ministries of Taiwan, India, South Korea and Indonesia 8.

Named in ten US indictments, 2014 to 2025: one square per person0state officers arrestedof 58 people (60 names) in 10 US indictments, 2014 to 2025Others arrested: 32 Malaysian businessmen, 1 Canadian launderernamed, no arrest announcedarrestednamed again2014PLA Unit 61398China · trade secrets from US nuclear, steel and solar firmsWang DongSun KailiangWen XinyuHuang ZhenyuGu Chunhui52016ITSec Team, Mersad (IRGC)Iran · DDoS on 46 firms, mostly banks; a New York damAhmad FathiHamid FirooziAmin ShokohiSadegh AhmadzadeganOmid GhaffariniaSina KeissarNader Saedi72018GRU Units 26165, 74455Russia · hacked the DNC and Clinton campaign, leaked itViktor NetykshoBoris AntonovDmitriy BadinIvan YermakovAleksey LukashevSergey MorgachevNikolay KozachekPavel YershovArtem MalyshevAleksandr OsadchukAleksey PotemkinAnatoliy Kovalev122018Chosun Expo (Lazarus)North Korea · Sony 2014, Bangladesh Bank $81M, WannaCryPark Jin Hyok12020APT41China, Malaysia · 100+ victims: software, games, telecomsZhang HaoranTan DailinJiang LizhiQian ChuanFu QiangWong Ong Hua (arrested in Malaysia)Ling Yang Ching (arrested in Malaysia)72 Malaysians arrested2020GRU Unit 74455 (Sandworm)Russia · Ukraine blackouts, NotPetya, OlympicsYuriy AndrienkoSergey DetistovPavel FrolovAnatoliy Kovalev (also named in 2018)Artem OchichenkoPetr Pliskin6Kovalev, again2021RGB (Lazarus)North Korea · theft and extortion of over $1.3BJon Chang HyokKim IlPark Jin Hyok (also named in 2018)Ghaleb Alaumary, Canadian launderer, charged separately3Park, again; + launderer2021APT40, Hainan State SecurityChina · trade secrets, US and 11 other countriesDing XiaoyangCheng QingminZhu YunminWu Shurong42024IRGC hack-and-leakIran · Trump campaign email, leaked to Biden campMasoud JaliliSeyyed Ali AghamiriYaser Balaghi32025i-Soon, MPS, APT27China · dissidents, US Treasury, foreign ministriesWu HaiboChen ChengWang ZheLiang GuodongMa LiWang YanXu LiangZhou WeiweiWang LiyuSheng JingYin KechengZhou Shuai12"No arrest announced": no later US Justice Department announcement of an arrest,extradition or guilty plea. The 2021 launderer was charged separately.
  • 2014, PLA Unit 61398 (China), trade secrets from US nuclear, steel and solar firms: Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, Gu Chunhui
  • 2016, ITSec Team, Mersad (IRGC) (Iran), DDoS on 46 firms, mostly banks; a New York dam: Ahmad Fathi, Hamid Firoozi, Amin Shokohi, Sadegh Ahmadzadegan, Omid Ghaffarinia, Sina Keissar, Nader Saedi
  • 2018, GRU Units 26165, 74455 (Russia), hacked the DNC and Clinton campaign, leaked it: Viktor Netyksho, Boris Antonov, Dmitriy Badin, Ivan Yermakov, Aleksey Lukashev, Sergey Morgachev, Nikolay Kozachek, Pavel Yershov, Artem Malyshev, Aleksandr Osadchuk, Aleksey Potemkin, Anatoliy Kovalev
  • 2018, Chosun Expo (Lazarus) (North Korea), Sony 2014, Bangladesh Bank $81M, WannaCry: Park Jin Hyok
  • 2020, APT41 (China, Malaysia), 100+ victims: software, games, telecoms: Zhang Haoran, Tan Dailin, Jiang Lizhi, Qian Chuan, Fu Qiang, Wong Ong Hua (arrested in Malaysia), Ling Yang Ching (arrested in Malaysia)
  • 2020, GRU Unit 74455 (Sandworm) (Russia), Ukraine blackouts, NotPetya, Olympics: Yuriy Andrienko, Sergey Detistov, Pavel Frolov, Anatoliy Kovalev (also named in 2018), Artem Ochichenko, Petr Pliskin
  • 2021, RGB (Lazarus) (North Korea), theft and extortion of over $1.3B: Jon Chang Hyok, Kim Il, Park Jin Hyok (also named in 2018), Ghaleb Alaumary, Canadian launderer, charged separately
  • 2021, APT40, Hainan State Security (China), trade secrets, US and 11 other countries: Ding Xiaoyang, Cheng Qingmin, Zhu Yunmin, Wu Shurong
  • 2024, IRGC hack-and-leak (Iran), Trump campaign email, leaked to Biden camp: Masoud Jalili, Seyyed Ali Aghamiri, Yaser Balaghi
  • 2025, i-Soon, MPS, APT27 (China), dissidents, US Treasury, foreign ministries: Wu Haibo, Chen Cheng, Wang Zhe, Liang Guodong, Ma Li, Wang Yan, Xu Liang, Zhou Weiwei, Wang Liyu, Sheng Jing, Yin Kecheng, Zhou Shuai
Ten US indictments of people hacking for or on behalf of a state, one square per named defendant. Squares stay outlined unless an arrest was announced. Dashed squares are people named a second time (Anatoliy Kovalev in 2018 and 2020, Park Jin Hyok in 2018 and 2021). The Canadian launderer in the 2021 row was charged separately and is not counted among the 60 names. 'No arrest' is inferred from the absence of any later DOJ announcement of an arrest, extradition or plea.

That is 60 names and 58 different people. Not all of them are officers: the list includes employees of the Iranian companies, the Chinese contractors and the front company. As far as the public record shows, not one state officer among them has been arrested.

Three people connected to these cases were. Malaysian authorities arrested the two Malaysian businessmen in the APT41 case on 14 September 2020 at US request 4; whether they were ever sent to the United States I could not confirm. Ghaleb Alaumary, a Canadian who laundered money for the North Korean scheme, was charged separately and agreed to plead guilty 5. None of the three was an officer, and none lived in the state that directed the hacking.

A note on method. The Justice Department does not publish a list of who is still at large, so “never arrested” here means that I found no later DOJ announcement of an arrest, extradition or plea for that person. Sometimes the department says it outright. Of the six GRU officers charged in 2020 it wrote that none were in US custody 4; the twelve charged in 2025 “remain at large” 8; and the Attorney General said the three Iranians charged in 2024 were all in Iran 9.

The wall is law

The first obstacle is written down. Article 61 of the Russian Constitution says that “a citizen of the Russian Federation may not be deported from Russia or extradited to another State” 10. China’s Extradition Law of 2000 says in Article 8 that a foreign request “shall be rejected” if the person sought is a Chinese national 11. Neither leaves room for discretion. A Russian or Chinese officer indicted in the United States will not be handed over by their own government, whatever the evidence.

A ban on extradition only explains why the state will not hand someone over. It does not explain why it does not try them itself. For that, the public record points to tolerance and sometimes to employment. In 2019 the US Treasury said that the leader of the Evil Corp group, Maksim Yakubets, was working for Russia’s FSB as of 2017 12. In 2024 it said his father-in-law, a former FSB officer, used his influence after the 2019 indictments to protect the group, including by “ensuring they were not pursued by Russian internal authorities” 13. According to the 2025 indictment, China’s Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Public Security paid i-Soon between about $10,000 and $75,000 for each email inbox it broke into 8. That is hacking bought as a government service.

Criminal groups show the same arrangement from the other side. The DarkSide ransomware checked whether a victim was in a country of the Commonwealth of Independent States and spared it. Trend Micro, which analysed the code, adds that the group would usually know where a target was long before the ransomware ran, so the check is a backstop rather than the main rule 14. The rule itself is the point: do not hit home.

The protection is a decision, though, and a state can change its mind without handing anyone over. Russia’s FSB detained members of the REvil ransomware group in January 2022, and in October 2024 a military court in St. Petersburg sentenced four of them to between four and a half and six years 15. In late 2024 Russian state media reported that a man identified as Mikhail Matveev, wanted in the United States with a reward of up to $10 million, had been charged in Kaliningrad with creating malware 16 44. Neither case sent anyone to an American court.

What governments do instead

When an arrest is impossible, the indictment itself becomes the product. It is a public attribution with names, units and evidence attached, filed in a form a court could test. China called the 2014 charges “absurd” and suspended a bilateral cyber working group in response 17. An indictment also does not expire on the day it is announced, which matters in the next section.

Sanctions follow. Treasury designated 17 individuals and seven entities around Evil Corp in 2019, alongside a reward of up to $5 million for Yakubets 12, and added more members in 2024 together with the United Kingdom and Australia 13. LockBit’s leader, Dmitry Khoroshev, was named, indicted and sanctioned in May 2024 (case file) 46. A sanction does not touch the person, but it makes paying them dangerous: Treasury warns that a victim who pays ransom to a sanctioned person may itself be violating sanctions 18.

Rewards are the third tool. The State Department offered up to $10 million for information on Conti’s leaders and up to $5 million for the arrest of any member 19, up to $10 million for Matveev 44, up to $10 million for the three Iranians 9, and up to $10 million for the i-Soon and Ministry of Public Security defendants 8.

The fourth is to go after what can be reached: servers, domains and money. In August 2023 an FBI-led operation took over the Qakbot botnet, which had infected about 700,000 computers, and seized more than $8.6 million in cryptocurrency 20. In February 2024 the UK’s National Crime Agency took control of LockBit’s administration system and leak site, and two LockBit actors were arrested in Poland and Ukraine 13. Operation Endgame in May 2024 took down more than 100 servers 21, seized more than 2,000 domains and led to four arrests, three in Ukraine and one in Armenia, while Germany issued warrants for eight more suspects 22. The arrests in these operations happen at the edges, in countries that cooperate. The people at the centre are named and put on wanted lists. The infrastructure chapter explains why a seized server is so useful to investigators.

How the reachable get caught

A named suspect inside a protecting state, and the paths that brought people within reachProtecting statewill not extradite its citizensand need not prosecute themnamed,chargedTried at home, if the state choosesREvil members, sentenced 20241 Travelto a country that cooperatesKlyushin, arrested in Switzerland, 20212 A cooperating statethey live there or hold its passportPanev, arrested in Israel, 20243 A layer gives waya reachable piece of the chainAlaumary, the launderer, 2021Within reacharrest, extradition,trialPrisoner swap, Aug 2024: Klyushin sent back to Russia
A named suspect inside a protecting state, and the three ways people in this essay came within reach of a court. The dashed path is the return trip: three of the people arrested abroad and tried in the United States were later sent back to Russia in exchanges.

The most common way is travel. Roman Seleznev, a Russian card thief, was taken into custody in the Maldives in July 2014 and later sentenced to 27 years 23. Yevgeniy Nikulin, who hacked LinkedIn and Dropbox, was arrested in Prague in October 2016 and sentenced to 88 months 24. Alexander Vinnik of the BTC-e exchange was arrested in Greece in 2017 25 and, after a spell in a French jail, extradited to the United States in August 2022 26. Vladislav Klyushin was arrested in Sion, Switzerland, in March 2021, extradited that December, sentenced to nine years and ordered to forfeit $34,065,419 27. Yaroslav Vasinskyi, a Ukrainian charged over the REvil attack on Kaseya, was arrested in October 2021 while entering Poland and sentenced to 13 years and seven months 28. Four alleged leaders of the 8Base ransomware group were arrested in Phuket, Thailand, in an operation by 14 countries that included Japan 29. Each of them was already charged or under investigation; the charge waited until they left.

The second way is to live in, or hold the passport of, a state that cooperates. Rostislav Panev, a LockBit developer with Russian and Israeli citizenship, was arrested in Israel in August 2024 at US request 30 and extradited in March 2025 31. The two Malaysians in the APT41 case are another example. On a much larger scale, the FBI says joint operations with India’s Central Bureau of Investigation led to about 175 arrests of call-centre fraudsters in 2025 and more than 475 since 2022 32.

The third is that one layer gives way somewhere the law can reach, even if the person at the top stays home. Alaumary handled the cash-out for the North Korean scheme from Canada and the United States 5; none of the three officers charged with the hacking has been arrested. The two LockBit arrests came from the same operation that seized its servers 13.

An arrest is not always the end. On 1 August 2024 the United States, Germany and Slovenia exchanged prisoners with Russia and Belarus at an airport in Ankara 33. Seleznev and Klyushin were among those sent back 34. In February 2025 the United States released Vinnik in exchange for the American teacher Marc Fogel 26. For a state that values its hackers, a convicted one can become a bargaining chip.

“Cyber war”: attribution with nobody to arrest

At the far end are attacks that governments describe as acts of states. The response there stops at naming. In February 2018 the White House said the Russian military had launched NotPetya, “the most destructive and costly cyber-attack in history”, causing billions of dollars in damage 35. The often-quoted figure of $10 billion is not in that statement; it comes from a White House assessment that Tom Bossert, then the president’s homeland security adviser, confirmed to Wired 36. The six GRU officers later charged over NotPetya are not in US custody 4.

In December 2017 Bossert attributed WannaCry to North Korea, with the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan joining the attribution. He also said the United States did not have “a lot of room left here to apply pressure” 37. Park Jin Hyok was publicly charged nine months later 3.

The more recent Chinese campaigns have not reached a courtroom at all. CISA, the NSA and the FBI said in February 2024 that they assessed “with high confidence” that Volt Typhoon was pre-positioning itself in US critical infrastructure networks, in some cases for at least five years; the advisory names no individuals 38. In November 2024 the FBI and CISA confirmed that PRC-affiliated actors had broken into several telecommunications companies and stolen call records and data tied to lawful intercept requests 39. The response two months later was a sanction on a Sichuan company the US says was involved 40.

Japan sees the same pattern. In January 2025 the National Police Agency and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity attributed a campaign against Japanese organisations since about 2019 to the group MirrorFace and assessed it as an organised attack in which Chinese involvement is suspected 41. No individual was named. In December 2024 the FBI, the Defense Department’s Cyber Crime Center and the NPA jointly attributed the theft of 4,502.9 bitcoin, worth $308 million, from DMM Bitcoin to North Korea’s TraderTraitor. The way in was a fake recruiter on LinkedIn who approached an employee at a wallet software supplier 42. Investigators found the weakest layer. It was a person at a supplier, and the people who exploited it are in a country no court can reach. The attribution chapter explains how such conclusions are reached.

How rare is an arrest?

There is no good figure. The only US-wide estimate whose method can be traced comes from a 2018 Third Way report. It took the 871 to 927 computer-crime arrests by federal, state and local agencies in 2016 and divided them by the 298,728 complaints the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received that year, which gives about 0.3%, or 3 arrests per 1,000 complaints. Assuming that only one victim in six reports a crime, it put the “effective” rate closer to 0.05% 43.

That is a ratio of two national totals, not the chance that any given attacker is caught. The arrests and the complaints are not the same cases. One arrest can cover hundreds of complaints or none of them, many of the arrests concern domestic crimes that never reached IC3, and the one-in-six factor is an assumption. It says, at most, that arrests are rare by two or three orders of magnitude. It cannot easily be updated, either. IC3 received 1,008,597 complaints in 2025, reporting $20.877 billion in losses, but its annual report gives no total arrest count to set against them 32.

Common misconceptions

  • “Attackers get away because they are anonymous.” Many of the most serious ones are not. Fifty-eight people are named in the ten indictments above 10 8. What protects them is where they live.
  • “An indictment without an arrest is theatre.” It is public attribution in a form a court could test, it is the basis for sanctions and rewards, and it waits. Klyushin was arrested when he flew to Switzerland 27.
  • “0.05% is the chance of being caught.” It is an estimate built by dividing national arrest counts by unrelated complaint counts, with an assumed reporting rate on top 43.
  • “Russia never acts against its own hackers.” It sentenced four REvil members in 2024. It did not hand any of them over 15.
  • “Once convicted, they serve the sentence.” Seleznev was sentenced to 27 years and went home in a prisoner exchange in 2024 23 34.

Sources

  1. U.S. Department of Justice, Western District of PennsylvaniaU.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantageprimary
  2. U.S. Department of JusticeSeven Iranians Working for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Affiliated Entities Charged for Conducting Coordinated Campaign of Cyber Attacks Against U.S. Financial Sectorprimary
  3. U.S. Department of JusticeNorth Korean Regime-Backed Programmer Charged With Conspiracy to Conduct Multiple Cyber Attacks and Intrusionsprimary
  4. U.S. Department of JusticeSeven International Cyber Defendants, Including "Apt41" Actors, Charged in Connection with Computer Intrusion Campaigns Against More Than 100 Victims Globallyprimary
  5. U.S. Department of JusticeThree North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyberattacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globeprimary
  6. U.S. Department of Justice, Southern District of CaliforniaFour Chinese Nationals Working with the Ministry of State Security Charged with Global Computer Intrusion Campaign Targeting Intellectual Property and Confidential Business Informationprimary
  7. Federal Bureau of InvestigationThree IRGC Cyber Actors Indicted for Hack-and-Leak Operation Designed to Influence the 2024 U.S. Presidential Electionprimary
  8. U.S. Department of JusticeJustice Department Charges 12 Chinese Contract Hackers and Law Enforcement Officers in Global Computer Intrusion Campaignsprimary
  9. The RecordUS charges three Iranians behind hack of Trump campaign
  10. University of Minnesota Human Rights LibraryConstitution of the Russian Federation (English translation), Article 61primary
  11. UNODC SHERLOC (text of the law adopted by the NPC Standing Committee)Extradition Law of the People's Republic of China (Order of the President No. 42), Article 8primary
  12. U.S. Department of the TreasuryTreasury Sanctions Evil Corp, the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Behind Dridex Malwareprimary
  13. U.S. Department of the TreasuryTreasury Sanctions Members of the Russia-Based Cybercriminal Group Evil Corp in Tri-Lateral Action with the United Kingdom and Australiaprimary
  14. Trend MicroWhat We Know About the DarkSide Ransomware and the US Pipeline Attack
  15. The Hacker NewsFour REvil Ransomware Members Sentenced in Rare Russian Cybercrime Convictions
  16. Infosecurity MagazineRussia Arrests Notorious Ransomware Actor Wazawaka
  17. The Christian Science MonitorUS indicts five in China's secret 'Unit 61398' for cyber-spying on US firms
  18. U.S. Department of the Treasury, OFACUpdated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Paymentsprimary
  19. The RecordUS State Department offering $10 million reward for information about Conti members
  20. U.S. Department of Justice, Central District of CaliforniaQakbot Malware Disrupted in International Cyber Takedownprimary
  21. EuropolLargest ever operation against botnets hits dropper malware ecosystemprimary
  22. The RecordEuropol-led 'Operation Endgame' targets dropper malware
  23. U.S. Department of JusticeRussian Cyber-Criminal Sentenced to 27 Years in Prison for Hacking and Credit Card Fraud Schemeprimary
  24. U.S. Department of Justice, Northern District of CaliforniaRussian Hacker Sentenced To Over 7 Years In Prison For Hacking Into Three Bay Area Tech Companiesprimary
  25. The RecordAlexander Vinnik reportedly released in prisoner swap between Russia and US
  26. The Moscow TimesWashington to Release Russian Crypto Kingpin Alexander Vinnik in Exchange for Marc Fogel, U.S. Official Says
  27. U.S. Department of Justice, District of MassachusettsRussian Businessman Sentenced to Nine Years in Prison in $93 Million Hack-to-Trade Conspiracyprimary
  28. BleepingComputerREvil hacker behind Kaseya ransomware attack gets 13 years in prison
  29. SecurityWeekAuthorities Disrupt 8Base Ransomware, Arrest Four Russian Operators
  30. U.S. Department of Justice, District of New JerseyU.S. Charges Dual Russian and Israeli National as Developer of LockBit Ransomware Groupprimary
  31. SecurityWeekLockBit Ransomware Developer Extradited to US
  32. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)Internet Crime Report 2025primary
  33. The RecordUS reportedly preparing to release Russian hackers in prisoner swap
  34. CyberScoopJailed cybercriminals returned to Russia in historic prisoner swap
  35. The White HouseStatement from the Press Secretary (NotPetya)primary
  36. Wired (Andy Greenberg)The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History
  37. The White HousePress Briefing on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware Attack to North Koreaprimary
  38. CISA, NSA, FBIPRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure (AA24-038A)primary
  39. CISA and FBIJoint Statement from FBI and CISA on the People's Republic of China (PRC) Targeting of Commercial Telecommunications Infrastructureprimary
  40. U.S. Department of StateU.S. Takes Action Against PRC-Linked Cyber Actors for Treasury Hack and Salt Typhoonprimary
  41. National Police Agency of Japan and NISCCyberattacks by MirrorFace: NPA and NISC advisory (in Japanese)primary
  42. FBI, DC3 and National Police Agency of JapanFBI, DC3, and NPA Identification of North Korean Cyber Actors, Tracked as TraderTraitor, Responsible for Theft of $308 Million USD from Bitcoin.DMM.comprimary
  43. Third Way (Eoyang, Peters, Mehta, Gaskew)To Catch a Hacker: Toward a comprehensive strategy to identify, pursue, and punish malicious cyber actors